Origin and concentration: Corporate ownership, control and performance in firms after privatization by Hanousek, Jan et al.
 Economics of Transition
Volume 15(1) 2007, 1–31
 
© 2007 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2007 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA
 




koce da and svejnarOrigin and concentration
 
Corporate ownership, control and performance 






















We analyse the effects of different types and concentration of ownership on
performance using a large population of firms in the Czech Republic after mass
privatization. Specifications based on first-differences combined with instrumental
variables show that the performance effects of different types and concentration of
ownership are limited when compared to earlier studies. Often, concentrated
ownership has a positive effect, a finding that supports the agency theory. The positive
effect of foreign ownership is detected primarily for majority ownership and for
ownership by foreign industrial firms. The state as a holder of the golden share has
a positive effect on employment and sometimes, also on output and profitability.
Overall, our results highlight the benefits of strategic restructuring accompanied
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We analyse the effects of different types of ownership, changes in ownership and
concentration of ownership on corporate performance using a population of firms
in the Czech Republic after mass privatization. In particular, we address the question
of whether private firms perform better than state-owned enterprises (SOE), and
whether post-privatization ownership structures lead to improvements in corporate
performance over time. In doing so, we control for the effects of privatization
and strive to minimize the key analytical problems that plague much of the large
literature on privatization. In particular, since privatization schemes do not assign
ownership to firms at random, many studies suffer from an inadequate treatment
of the selection (endogeneity) of ownership. Unlike other studies, we use an instru-




Careful micro-econometric studies of ownership effects on performance date
back to Caves and Christensen’s (1980) classic study that found private and state-
owned Canadian railways performing equally efficiently in a head-on competition.
Since the 1990s studies have focused primarily on privatization, and recent surveys
came up with assessments that range from finding a large variation of outcomes
but no systematically significant effect of privatization on performance (Bevan,
Estrin and Schaffer, 1999), through cautiously concluding that privatization around
the world tends to improve firm performance (Megginson and Netter, 2001), to being
fairly confident that privatization improves performance (Djankov and Murrell,




Apart from being diverse, the estimated performance effects found in much
of the literature on transition economies are not firmly established. The credibility
issue arises from three interrelated analytical problems that may be expected in
earlier studies. First, the studies have relied on data covering short time periods
immediately before and after privatization. Hence, they at best capture the short-
term effects of privatization rather than the medium-term and long-term effects of
a switch from state to private or mixed ownership. Second, the studies (a) often use
small and sometimes unrepresentative samples of firms, (b) are frequently unable
to identify ownership accurately because privatization is still ongoing or because
the frequent post-privatization changes of ownership are hard to detect, and (c) often








 As Angrist and Krueger (2001) point out, in a setting such as ours this procedure is desirable because


















(1996), Bilsen and Konings (1998), Grosfeld and Nivet (1997), and Claessens and Djankov (1999). See also
Claessens (1997) and Filer and Hanousek (2002) for a discussion of these issues.
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have not been able to control adequately for endogeneity of ownership and their










 As a result, they often treat ownership as a relatively simple categorical
concept and are unable to distinguish the exact extent of ownership by individual
owners or even by relatively homogeneous groups of owners. As we discuss
below, this has also prevented many of these studies from providing evidence for
a lively debate about the desirability of concentrated versus dispersed ownership
on corporate performance. The second generation of studies, to which this paper




In this paper, we address systematically the three types of above-mentioned
problems. In particular, in analysing the performance effects of ownership, we (a)
use panel data on a majority of the medium and large firms that went through
mass privatization in the Czech Republic and which constituted the bulk of the
country’s economic activity, (b) cover a 4-year period after privatization when
accounting rules conforming to the international accounting standards (IAP)  were
already in place, and (c) control for endogeneity of ownership using a first-difference
specification together with instrumental variables from rich data on pre-market
(initial) conditions of these firms. Compared to earlier studies, we also develop
a more systematic analytical framework for evaluating the performance effect
of post-privatization ownership, distinguish between instantaneous and perma-
nent effects of ownership changes, and use more detailed data on the extent of
ownership by specific types of owners.
By carrying out a detailed study of one model economy, we obviously raise
the issue of the general validity of our results. However, we are able to take into








’s (2000) econometric evidence indicates that better-performing firms tend to be privatized first.
Moreover, as we indicate below, Djankov and Murrell’s (2002) survey of studies dealing with the impact of
privatization on performance indicates that one-half of the studies do not treat this issue at all. Our exam-








 (1997), Smith, Cin and Vodopivec (1997), Claessens and Djankov (1999), and




 In particular, note studies such as Grosfeld and Tressel (2001) and Cull, Matesova and Shirley (2002).
Furthermore, Joh (2003) finds that firms with low ownership concentration show low profitability, control-
ling for firm and industry characteristics. Careful assessment of banks’ performance is carried out by Bonin,
Hasan and Wachtel (2005a) who find that foreign-owned banks are more cost-efficient than other banks and
that they also provide better service, especially if they have a strategic foreign owner. The remaining
government-owned banks are less efficient in providing services, which is consistent with the hypothesis
that the better banks were privatized first in transition countries. Furthermore, Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel
(2005b) demonstrate that foreign-owned banks are most efficient and government-owned banks are least
efficient. In addition Fries and Taci (2005) show that private banks are more efficient than state-owned banks
and privatized banks with majority foreign ownership are the most efficient and those with domestic
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being able to control adequately for cross-country differences in the institutional





We find, contrary to expectations and results of many earlier studies, that the
effects of different types and concentrations of ownership on firm performance are
limited and that many types of private owners do not bring about performance
that is different from that of firms with substantial state ownership. We do detect,
however, significant effects of specific types of private ownership. In particular, a
positive effect of concentrated ownership is discernible, but only in some instances
and for selected performance indicators, and a positive effect of foreign ownership
is found primarily in the case of majority ownership and appears to be driven by
the behaviour of foreign industrial (non-financial) firms. Concentrated foreign
owners (foreign industrial companies as owners) generate superior performance
compared to all other types of owners in terms of growth of sales, and in some
specifications also profitability, and concentrated domestic owners (domestic industrial
companies and investment funds as owners) reduce employment relative to others.
Overall, our results highlight the benefits of concentrated ownership and inflow




 Our firm-level findings complement the
macro results of Zinnes, Eilat and Sachs (2001) and Barrell and Pain (1997) that real,





The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide information
on the privatization process that generated our data, while in Section 3 we discuss
the relevant features of the legal system and the hypothesized implications of
different types of ownership on firm performance. In Section 4, we describe the
data and basic statistics and in Section 5 we outline our empirical strategy. We
present our empirical estimates in Section 6 and draw conclusions in Section 7.
 
2. Privatization in the Czech Republic
 
We analyse the 1996–99 performance effects of the main patterns of ownership and








, 1999; D’Souza and
Megginson, 1999) are forced by the paucity of data to use pooled cross-country estimations. On the other
hand, using cross-country data Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami (2005) show that the positive effect of
ownership concentration on firm performance is stronger in countries with weak investor protection. They
also find that private ownership tends to concentrate over time and that the level of institutional develop-




 Cull, Matesova, and Shirley (2002) show that among the firms privatized in the Czech Republic from 1993
to 1996, voucher-privatized joint stock companies perform worse than firms with concentrated sharehold-
ings that had to be purchased for cash (i.e., limited liability companies and foreign joint stock companies).
They control for size and structure but they do not address in detail the issue of endogeneity of ownership.
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swaps occurred. We start by briefly outlining the privatization programme that
was carried out in the Czech Republic in the first half of the 1990s under three
different schemes: restitution, small-scale privatization and large-scale privatization.
The first two schemes started in 1990 and were most important during the early
years of the transition. Large-scale privatization, by far the most important scheme,




 The privatization programme
permitted the use of various privatization techniques. Small firms were usually
auctioned off or sold in tenders. Many medium businesses were sold in tenders or
to pre-determined buyers in direct sales. Most large and many medium firms were
transformed into joint stock companies and their shares were distributed through
voucher privatization, or sold in public auctions or to strategic partners, or transferred
to municipalities.
The voucher scheme was part of the large-scale privatization process, with two




The early post-privatization ownership structure emerged as shares from the
second wave were distributed in early 1995 and rapid reallocation of shares across
new owners took place in 1995–96 during the so-called ‘third wave’ of privatization
as new owners, including the investment privatization funds (IPF), reshaped
their initial post-privatization portfolios of acquired companies. Depending on
the investor, the swapping of shares in 1995–96 was aimed at (a) portfolio diver-
sification, (b) obtaining concentrated ownership in specific firms and industries,
and (c) achieving conformity with legal requirements aimed at preventing




 The 1995–96 ownership
changes were massive, unregulated and frequently unobservable to outsiders,
including researchers. Investors, especially the IPFs, engaged in direct swaps of
large blocks of shares, and off-market share trading was common. More stable and,
from the standpoint of firm performance, more meaningful, patterns of ownership










enda (1999), Kotrba (1995), Svejnar and Singer (1994). For development of ownership structures in












 The regulation of IPFs evolved gradually through Decree no. 383/1991, its Amendment no. 62/1992, and
Act no. 248/1992. The most important clauses restricted each privatization fund from investing more than
10 percent of points acquired in the voucher scheme in a single company and obtaining in exchange more
than 20 percent of shares in any company. Privatization funds established by a single founder were allowed
to accumulate up to 40 percent of shares in a given company, but this cap was later reduced to 20 percent.
Many privatization funds circumvented the cap through mergers. The Act also prohibited IPFs founded by
financial institutions from purchasing shares of other financial institutions to prevent excessive concentra-









© 2007 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2007 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
 
3. Forms of ownership and hypothesized effects on performance
 
3.1 Concentrated or dispersed ownership?
 
A major issue that has received renewed attention is whether concentrated or
dispersed ownership is more conducive to good corporate performance. Since we
can identify all owners with ownership stakes of 10 percent or more, we are able




 In view of the
diversity of predictions, we take as our null hypothesis the proposition that
ownership concentration has no effect on firm performance.
Depending on their stakes, different blockholders have under the Czech law
different opportunities to influence corporate governance. In particular, the law
provides important rights of ownership and control to owners with majority owner-
ship (more than 50 percent of shares), blocking minority ownership (more than
33 percent but not more than 50 percent of shares) and what we define as legal
minority ownership (at least 10 but not more than 33 percent of shares). Majority
ownership grants the owner the right to staff management and supervisory boards,
alter and transfer firms’ assets and make crucial strategic decisions at general
shareholders’ meetings. Through management and supervisory boards, majority
ownership also facilitates more direct executive control of the company. The
blocking minority ownership gives the right to block a number of decisions, such
as those related to increasing or reducing assets and implementing major changes
in business activities that the majority shareholder may strive to implement at
the general shareholders’ meeting. Finally, legal minority ownership is potentially
important because the law entitles the holder of this stake to call the general
shareholders’ meeting and obstruct its decisions by delaying their implementation
through lengthy court proceedings. Effective legal minority shareholders (including
the state) may thus use their ownership position to delay or completely block the






 A survey by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) summarizes the agency problem arising from the separation of
ownership and control and argues for the desirability of concentrated ownership. On the other hand,
models of asymmetric information and optimal delegation of authority (e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1997) point
to the importance of managerial initiative and incentives to acquire information, highlighting the fact that
concentrated ownership with little delegation of formal authority to managers may be deleterious to firm
performance. An aspect of agency theory takes into account an opportunity for a change in ownership, such
as an active secondary market or takeover possibilities. For more discussion of ownership concentration see





 An interesting phenomenon is observed in the case of portfolio companies that are primarily interested
in capital gains. These companies have been observed to buy 10 percent positions in firms where they can
sell the stake at a premium to the dominant shareholder whose business strategy is to avoid excessive
scrutiny by an institutionally strong minority shareholder.
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Overall, the majority and blocking minority represent different degrees of
concentrated ownership, while the legal minority may be viewed as a form of
moderately dispersed ownership. Highly dispersed ownership arises when the
stake of the largest holder held does not reach legal (10 percent) minority. We also
know whether the government keeps a golden share in a given firm that gives it the
right to veto certain managerial decisions, such as the subject of business activities
and sales of assets, and indirectly influence all managerial decisions. Institutional
evidence suggests that the golden share may be an important mechanism enabling




3.2 Types of ownership
 
Most empirical work has focused on relatively broad categories of ownership. In
this paper, we cover broad categories but also assess whether finer ownership
distinctions that reflect different business activities of the owners provide a mean-
ingful understanding of the effects of ownership on corporate performance. In
particular, we examine the effects of six types of domestic and two types of foreign
ownership that may have differing implications for corporate objectives, constraints
and governance. The six types of domestic owners are the state, industrial (i.e.,
non-financial) company, bank, investment fund, portfolio company and individual,
while the two types of foreign owners are an industrial (non-financial) company




 Since the literature does not provide clear-cut predic-
tions about the relative performance effects of these types of owners, we formulate
our null hypothesis as stating that different owners do not have different effects on
performance.
Using information from analytical and institutional literatures, we next briefly
outline plausible hypotheses about the behaviour of different owners. The state as
an owner may pursue various goals, including economic efficiency, tax revenues,
or social goals such as employment. The results of Gupta, Ham and Svejnar’s (2000)
analysis suggest that in the Czech case revenue maximization was important in




 The golden share was introduced by Act no. 210/1993, modifying Act no. 92/1991. The act set the
conditions for property transfer from the state to others with the aim of protecting special interests of the
state in firms privatized in large-scale privatization. The veto rights associated with the golden share usually
relate to the scope and line of business activity and depend on each company’s charter. When the state sells
its golden share, it gives up its rights in the company and the golden share ceases to exist. The instrument
of the golden share in the Czech Republic does not conform fully to that found in other countries since it





 Since insiders have not been important in the Czech Republic, we do not analyse this type of ownership.
We also do not examine whether a given owner belongs to a larger ownership group. With considerable
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important in the post-privatization phase when unemployment was on the rise.
The ownership of a firm by an industrial company may be expected to increase
profitability through cost-cutting, integration of activities and expansion aimed at
exploiting economies of scale. Bank ownership is expected to impose pressure on





 while investment (mutual) funds are expected to pursue profitable oppor-
tunities and, when desirable, take significant equity positions. Funds may hence





folio companies in the Czech Republic are diversified investment vehicles that
engage in business with both corporate and private customers. Their ownership
positions in large firms are more limited than those of the funds, but the experience
in advanced market economies indicates that portfolio companies often force man-
agement to become more profitable. Individual ownership is widely perceived to
give the single residual claimant strong incentives to monitor the management and
achieve superior firm performance. Finally, in a country with low labour cost and
favourable profit repatriation rules, foreign owners are expected to aim at generat-
ing profits and, if the local products can be sold through their global distribution
network, also on increasing output and hence employment. The issue that arises is
whether profits generated by firms with foreign owners are declared or hidden
through transfer pricing. Naturally, in an underdeveloped legal and institutional
setting, any one type of ownership could be associated with managers or key
shareholders appropriating private benefits at the expense of others, directly or
through transfer pricing.
 




We start our analysis by providing an understanding of whether corporate restructur-




 Ownership involvement of Czech banks in other companies resembles the situation in Germany. Allen
and Gale (1995), with reference to the German financial market, argue that the fact that the market for
corporate control collapses when stock markets are thin could be made up for by the role of banks as
delegated monitors holding equity and exercising their voting rights. Czech banks, with their numerous




enda (2001), the newly created




 Makhija and Patton (2004) find that the extent of disclosure is positively related to (Czech) investment
fund ownership at low levels of fund ownership but is negatively related to investment fund ownership at
high levels of fund ownership. One may also expect the effect of investment fund and bank ownership on
performance to be weaker in our data than in general because a number of funds were sponsored by banks
that held debt of the same firms of which they became large blockholders. This resulted in a conflict of
interest and inertia in implementing radical restructuring.
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or cost (the two main components of profit). The variables that we use are sales




 Profitability is widely viewed as the best ultimate
measure of corporate performance and we therefore also use operating profit
on sales (profit/sales or return on sales) and the return on assets (ROA) as two
measures of profitability. As we discuss below, we carry out our estimation in first
differences and we therefore define these two dependent variables as the annual
rate of change of operating profit on sales and the annual change in ROA, with the












 – 1. By using the profit/sales ratio, we take
advantage of the fact that this indicator is based on two flow measures that are
less sensitive to inflation and accounting conventions than many other indicators.




 – 1 in calculating the change in ROA, our measure





The four indicators of performance permit us to draw inferences about the extent
to which firms with different ownership engage in the two types of restructuring









 Defensive restructuring is primarily related to short-term
measures, such as layoffs and reductions in wages, while strategic restructuring
refers to deliberate investments in the development of firms’ advantages, such as
introducing new products and finding new markets, and it results in increased
sales revenues and profits. Furthermore, by examining the simultaneous effects of
different types of ownership on the change of sales, labour cost and profitability,
we are able to draw tentative conclusions about the presence of phenomena such
as inefficiencies, possible appropriation of profits by managers or key shareholders,
non-labour costs, and non-sale income.
Our working dataset contains 2,529–2,949 observations on an unbalanced panel





1999. As we indicate in Table 1, the exact number of observations and firms
varies slightly across the four performance indicators. The observations represent
a cleaned dataset from the entire population of firms that were listed on the Prague
Stock Exchange (PSE) in 1996. Since virtually all large and medium-sized firms
privatized in large-scale privatization were listed on PSE, the dataset contains most
of these firms. In addition to performance variables, our dataset contains detailed




 We do not use other measures of performance, such as material costs, because the sample size would be




 Our measure would provide a biased indicator of a change in ROA, however, if productive assets were
sold and, as a result, both assets and profit (rather than just assets) diminished. However, only about 5
percent of the firms in our sample actually reduced their assets and, as we discuss below, firms that




 See Aghion and Carlin (1996), Aghion, Blanchard and Carlin (1997), and Grosfeld and Roland (1997) for
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firm’s privatization history (including performance and institutional data from the
pre-privatization period). The data sample was compiled by the authors from
information provided by Aspekt, a commercial database, the PSE, the National
Property Fund (the privatization agency) of the Czech Republic, and the Business
Register of the Czech Republic.
Firm-level data from the transition and emerging market economies often suffer
from accounting deficiencies and usually contain missing values and outlier observa-
tions that may bias the estimated coefficients (Filer and Hanousek, 2002). Firms
operating in the Czech Republic started adopting international accounting stand-
ards in 1992, and our discussions with international accounting firms located in the





99 data are hence from a period in which IAS already dominated local
accounting standards. Moreover, the data are reported by firms that had to
conform to the standards demanded since the mid-1990s by the main regulatory
institutions, namely the PSE, the National Property Fund and the Czech National
Bank. The data are therefore relatively reliable and free of the accounting deficiencies
that plague the early studies.
We have eliminated a few observations that were based on inconsistent values
in the levels of variables, such as negative values of sales or labour cost or some
observations with extreme values. We have used Heckman’s (1979) procedure to correct





 On average, within the 4-year (1996–99) period we have data for three




 In particular, using the original set of observations we first ran a Heckman-type probit equation, predict-
ing the probability that a given observation is included in the subsample on the basis of the following
variables: the initial values of the performance indicators and their squares and products, as well as dummy
variables capturing the presence of a given firm in a particular privatization wave.
Table 1. Summary statistics of the rate of change of performance indicators: 1996–99
Annual rate 
of change of




ROA* 0.001 0.098 −0.393 0.387 1,540 2,905
Profit/sales −0.267 0.982 −2.995 2.985 1,289 2,164
Sales 0.009 0.426 −1.000 2.820 1,371 2,592
Labour costs 0.010 0.364 −1.000 2.842 1,539 2,949
Notes: The ratio of the number of observations to number of firms varies due to the unbalanced nature of the panel.
* ROA is defined as a ratio of change in profits between two consecutive periods to total assets at the
beginning period. Formally: [(Profit(t) − Profit(t − 1))/Total assets(t − 1)]. SD, standard deviation.
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 We have also carried out a number of checks against official and private
records to verify that our ownership information is reliable and that we hence meet
the criticism of earlier privatization studies raised by Filer and Hanousek (2002).
 
4.2 Ownership data
An important feature of our dataset is that it permits us to analyse the effect of
ownership on performance using two detailed sets of ownership measures. First,
as in most studies, we evaluate the performance effects associated with different
types of a single largest owner (SLO): six domestic and two foreign types. Second,
we assign all owners into three categories that have figured prominently in the
debates on ownership and are widely believed to have different effects on cor-
porate governance and performance − state, domestic private and foreign ownership.
Having included all owners in one of these three categories, we examine whether
majority, blocking minority and legal minority ownership by each of these three
groups of owners affects the firm’s performance.23 With both specifications of
ownership, we also assess if the state affects corporate performance by retaining a
golden share that gives it the right to block certain managerial decisions.
As may be seen in Table 2, domestic industrial companies are the most frequent SLOs
with 1,244 observations, followed by domestic investment funds (423 observations),
domestic individuals (335) and the Czech state (174). Foreign industrial companies
are by far the most frequent SLOs among the foreign investors (236 observations).
Ownership concentration, measured by the average stake held by a SLO, is between
38 and 59 percent, which is rather high in comparison to ownership concentration
in developed countries (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) and it resembles more the
continental European than Anglo-American ownership concentration patterns.
Foreign owners as a group tend to hold majority ownership stakes in the acquired
firms (panel B of Table 2). The situation is just the opposite for domestic private
owners and the state, both of whom have average stakes of around 43–45 percent
and display absolutely and relatively more cases of blocking and legal minority
ownership than majority ownership. Moreover, the state retains a golden share
primarily in firms in which it or domestic private owners are the SLO. Finally,
there are 33 observations with highly dispersed ownership in the sense that no
type of owner has even a legal (10 percent) minority ownership.24
22 There are 34 sales and 28 labour cost observations for which the rate of growth is missing.
23 In this analysis, we focus on the effects of majority and blocking or legal minority ownership irrespective
of how many different owners of the same type compose the majority or minority groups.
24 These observations come from 25 firms that are larger than average in terms of total assets, but otherwise
tend to have quite diverse characteristics. The firms belong to various sectors, with seven being in trade and
four in construction and building materials sectors. In five firms foreign owners have the largest, albeit


























Table 2. Ownership extent and categories: Summary statistics

























Industrial Co. 1,244 48.83 547 412 272 13 42
Bank  33 46.42 11 14 7 1 1
Invest. fund  423 37.61 96 119 205 3 19
Individual  335 38.92 82 99 150 4 13
Portfolio Co.  80 45.06 22 35 22 1 5
State  174 43.18 49 63 58 4 66
Foreign ownership
Industrial Co.  236 58.81 139 60 30 7 6
Others  67 51.23 26 26 15 0 3
Total 2,592 46.16 972 828 759 33 155
Panel B: Ownership extent




















Domestic 2,115 44.84 758 679 656 22 80
Foreign  303 57.14 165 86 45 7 9
State  174 43.18 49 63 58 4 66
Total 2,592 46.16 972 828 759 33 155
Note: This table contains basic ownership statistics associated with the performance variable of sales. Statistics for other performance indicators are
similar. Ownership concentration categories include majority (more than 50 percent of shares), blocking minority (from more than 33 to 50 percent
of shares), legal minority (at least 10 percent but not more than 33 percent of shares), and other (less than 10 percent of shares). All ownership
categories are mutually exclusive. The golden share is an additional measure that is not associated with any particular extent of ownership.
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In terms of the dynamics of ownership structure, we observe substantial owner-
ship changes during the post-privatization period under study. In particular, 7 to
48 percent of our sample changed category by the type of SLO, with the greatest
(smallest) shift being toward an industrial company (bank) as the SLO. Further-
more, 15 to 31 percent of our sample changed category by extent of ownership.
Ownership changes were relatively evenly distributed over 1996–99.
5. The econometric model
5.1 Model specification
Our main goal is to analyse the performance effects of the principal types of owner-
ship that we observe after the large-scale privatization in 1996, and the effects of
the changes in ownership that took place in the 1996–99 post-privatization period.
In the spirit of Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and Heckman and Hotz (1989), we
specify a panel-data treatment evaluation procedure that fits our context, and we
supplement it with a rich set of instrumental variables.
Let Xijt be a given performance indicator, with subscripts denoting firm i with
ownership type j, in year t. Moreover, let Pijt denote ownership type j of firm i in
year t. A logarithmic model of the level of performance may be specified as.
ln Xijt = αi + αt + (Pij1t)βj + (Xij1t)γj + Pijτδj + [Pijτ (t − τ)]θj + (Dt)ϕ + υijt (1)
where t is a linear time trend, vector αi controls for firm-specific (fixed effect)
differences in the level of performance across firms, constant α captures the
linearly time-varying performance effect of state SLO or state majority ownership
(depending on ownership categorization) in 1996–99, and all dummy variables in
Equation (1) are coded relative to α.25 Column vector βj thus reflects the (linearly)
time-varying effects on performance of all the other types of 1996 (initial post-
privatization) ownership Pij1 relative to state SLO or state majority ownership.26
Vector γj in turn captures the time-varying effect of the 1996 level of performance
Xij1 on subsequent (1996–99) performance. Similarly, vector δj captures the time invar-
iant (instantaneous) effect on the level of performance of a firm changing its 1996
ownership to a new ownership category Pijτ in a given year τ after 1996. Comple-
menting δj, vector θj reflects the time-varying effect on performance brought about
by the new type of ownership Pijτ established in the firm at time τ . Finally, vector
25 The results on relative effects are unaffected by which ownership category we select as the base.
26 Coding the ownership dummy variables so that the effects of non-state ownership forms is measured
relative to the effect of state ownership is useful because firms in which the state retains ownership are the
ones that are least privatized and under the null hypothesis also least restructured. More importantly, the
approach also reflects the change in performance as firms switch from state to private ownership.
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ϕ represents the time-varying effects of D − industry and annual dummy variables
as well as dummy variables reflecting the form of privatization of the firm (first or
second wave, both waves, or outside of the voucher scheme), and υijt is the error
term.
Conceptually, we control for innate differences in the level of firm performance
through the firm-specific fixed effects αi and we also allow each firm’s 1996–99
performance to be affected linearly through time by the initial performance level
Xij1 that the firm achieved in 1996. Controlling for these factors, which capture the
short-term effects of pre-1996 privatization and restructuring, we estimate the time-
varying performance effects βj of the initial (1996) post-privatization ownership Pij1,
the time-invariant effect on performance δj of switching to a new type of ownership
Pijτ during the 1996–99 period, and the time-varying effect θj of this new ownership.
Our specification thus controls for fixed performance differences among firms
that were or were not part of the voucher scheme, inter-firm differences in the
initial post-privatization performance, annual economy-wide shifts (such as macro
shocks or degree of openness to trade) and industry-specific fixed effects (proxying
for factors such as the degree of competition or differences in technology that do
not change in the short run). In the context of the debate about the performance
effects of ownership versus competition, we focus on estimating the effects of
ownership, while controlling for competition by the firm-specific fixed effects,
the effect of initial performance interacted with the time trend, and the industry-
specific and annual time dummy variables interacted with time.
For estimating purposes, it is useful to express Equation (1) in the form of the
annual rate of change specification. In particular, letting yijt be the percentage
change of Xijt from t − 1 to t, Equation (1) may be expressed in a first-difference
specification as an estimating equation
yijt = α + Pij1βj + Xij1γj + ∆Pijτδj + Pijτθj + Dϕ + εijt (2)
where εijt = υijt − υijt−1 is the error term. Equation (2) is more parsimonious than (1),
but it permits us to estimate all the parameters of interest. Equations (1) and (2)
also make it clear that the linearly time-varying effects on the level of performance
in Equation (1) are equivalent to the time-invariant effects on the rate of change of
performance in Equation (2).
The three key econometric issues that we have to account for are omitted vari-
ables bias, measurement error, and endogeneity of ownership. We address omitted
variables bias by including a number of control variables discussed above. In
dealing with measurement error in ownership, performance and other variables,
we note that the error can induce standard attenuation as well as more complicated
biases in estimated coefficients. As mentioned above, the earlier studies often suffer
from mis-measurement of the ownership variables and performance indicators,
including outliers that may seriously affect the estimated coefficients. In collecting
the present dataset, we have placed particular emphasis on identifying precisely
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individual owners and changes in ownership, as well as collecting several indica-
tors of performance from a period when the IAS was in place. We have also tested
for and eliminated outliers that affect the estimates.
We address the problem of endogeneity of ownership as follows. First, we use
the first-difference specification in Equation (2) with the aforementioned covariates
as a panel data treatment evaluation procedure to control for the possibility that
firms are not assigned to different ownership categories at random and that certain
types of owners (e.g., foreigners) may acquire firms that are inherently superior or
inferior performers.27 Second, since first-differencing does not fully address all
types of endogeneity, especially those where the effect is time-varying, we also
employ an instrumental variable strategy.
5.2 Instrumental variables
We start by carrying out the Hausman (1978) specification test for assessing the
potential endogeneity of the initial post-privatization ownership. We employ the
first-difference IV method in which we treat ownership as potentially endogenous
and instrument it by IVs that we describe presently. The test is carried out by
differencing the two sets of parameter estimates and standardizing the vector of
differences by the difference in the covariance matrices of the two sets of estimates.
The resulting quadratic form is asymptotically chi-squared with degrees of free-
dom equal to the number of parameters being tested.28 Results of the Hausman test
confirm that 1996 ownership should be treated as endogenous.
We proceed by using a unique set of firm-specific instrumental variables that
we have created from data related to the pre-privatization (pre-1992) period. The
instrumental variables reflect economic, institutional, industry and geographic
characteristics of the SOEs in the pre-market period, and we use them to instru-
ment the initial post-privatization ownership that we observe in the market econ-
omy in 1996. We find that all the IVs described below pass the formal Sargan–Wu,
Hansen’s J and Bassman tests of overidentifying restrictions at the 1 percent test
level, and in this sense they qualify as valid instruments.
For each firm we have collected detailed information from all the proposed
privatization projects that were submitted to the government before privatization.29
We use the number of privatization projects as an IV because many SOEs attracted
27 This approach is used in some studies, such as Frydman et al. (1999).
28 In practice, some diagonal elements of the covariance matrix are negative. As usual, we carry out the test
only for parameters corresponding to the positive diagonal elements, with a corresponding correction to the
degrees of freedom, using the generalized inverse matrix (procedure YINVO in TSP 4.5).
29 Privatization of each enterprise was based on an officially accepted privatization project. Each project had
to contain recent economic and financial information about the enterprise and describe the proposed
method of privatization, as well as the proposed organization of the privatized enterprise. See Kotrba and
Svejnar (1994) for details.
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several privatization project proposals, reflecting the degree of investor interest
and expected future performance of the firm. Moreover, for each privatized firm
we use as IVs the pre-privatization data on registered (share) capital, net asset
value, total number of shares, number of shares entering voucher privatization,
number of shares allocated through voucher privatization, value of shares allo-
cated through voucher privatization in voucher points, geographic and industry
location of the firm and the structure of share ownership among various domestic
and foreign parties as proposed in the winning privatization project. The share
ownership variables include the share that the government intended to keep for
the short or long term.30 Finally, our set of IVs contains annual observations on the
SOE’s sales, profit, debt and employment during the three consecutive years pre-
ceding privatization. The summary statistics related to the instrumental variables
are reported in Tables A1–A3 (Appendix), while the first stage IV regressions are
reported in Tables A4–A5. The three-year panel permits us to capture the evolution
of enterprise performance before privatization. For the sake of comparability across
firms, we scale these indicators by the total number of shares. As may be seen from
Tables A4 and A5 (Appendix), the first stage regressions have relatively good fit
and intuitively acceptable coefficients.
In addition to controlling for endogeneity of the ownership structure resulting
from privatization, we control for possible endogeneity problems associated with
changes in ownership in the 1996–99 period by including in Equation (1) owner-
ship group fixed effects δj for firms undergoing ownership changes. These δj effects
may be interpreted as proxying unobserved performance characteristics of the
acquired firms (i.e., new owners cherry-picking winners or taking over losers) or
reflecting the time invariant effects of new ownership on the level of performance.
In order to check the robustness of our results, we have also estimated models that,
analogously to including Xij1 as a regressor, include Xijτ − the performance achieved
by the previous owner at the time τ when there is a change of ownership in 1996–
99. This specification does not produce materially different results from those of
Equation (2).
6. Empirical results of the effects of ownership on performance
Our estimates are generated by the Huber–White procedure yielding heteroskedasticity-
adjusted residuals in the presence of instrumental variables (see Huber, 1967; White,
1982). We have also checked that the residuals are free from serial correlation. We
30 Short-term government ownership reflects the expectation of the government of being able to sell appre-
ciated shares shortly after privatization, while long-term government ownership indicates an expectation of
slower appreciation of the value of the privatized firm and/or its strategic character in the economy. Parts
of the shares retained by the government were also classified as intended for restitution or future sale
through an intermediary.
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employ a two-stage least squares procedure in which we instrument all variables
related to ownership. The approach provides consistent estimates that are not
affected by potential model misspecification.31
In Tables 3 and 4, we present the estimated coefficients of the instrumented
Equation (2) for the SLO and extent of ownership, respectively.32 The top panel of
each table contains estimates of the linearly time-varying effect βj of the initial
(1996) post-privatization ownership Pij1, the second panel gives the estimates of the
time-varying effect θj of the subsequent ownership Pijτ established after 1996, and
the third panel presents the time-invariant effect δj of the post-1996 change in
ownership ∆Pijτ.
In examining the results, we note the extent to which different types of owner-
ship result in defensive restructuring (reducing labour cost and possibly also sales)
versus strategic restructuring (increasing sales revenues, labour productivity and/
or profits). Since the latter outcomes are inferred from the relative effects on sales,
labour cost and profitability (e.g., increased sale and/or reduced labour costs not
being accompanied by higher profits), these findings are also consistent with other
phenomena such as changes in non-labour costs and non-sales income.
The estimated coefficients in Tables 3 and 4 make it clear that in the first 4 years
after privatization the performance effects of different types of ownership are sur-
prisingly limited and that many types of private ownership do not generate effects
that are different from those of majority or SLO state ownership. Moreover, the
overall fit of these regressions suggests that ownership explains a small part of
total variation in the rate of change of corporate performance after privatization.33
6.1 The single largest owner
As may be seen from the first panel of Table 3, the only initial post-privatization
SLO that has a positive, time-varying effect on sales is foreign industrial (that is,
non-financial) company. All five types of domestic non-state SLOs, as well as the
foreign non-industrial SLO, register effects that are not statistically different from
31 As Angrist and Krueger (2001) point out, ‘Researchers are sometimes tempted to use probit or logit to
generate first-stage predicted values in applications with a dummy endogenous regressor. But this is not
necessary and may even do some harm. In two-stage least squares, consistency of the second-stage estimates
does not turn on getting the first-stage functional form right (Kelejian, 1971). Moreover, using a non-linear
first stage to generate fitted values that are plugged directly into the second-stage equation does not gener-
ate consistent estimates unless the non-linear model happens to be exactly right, a result which makes the
dangers of misspecification high’.
32 In Tables 3 and 4, the constant reflects the 1996–97 rate of change in performance of firms that have state
as a SLO and majority owner, respectively, were partially privatized outside of the voucher scheme, and
operate in the miscellaneous (‘other’) category of the nineteen industries for which we control. The esti-
mated coefficients on the various forms of ownership represent the average annual ownership effects rela-
tive to the effect of state SLO or majority ownership.
33 This is, of course, consistent with high correlation coefficients in the specification in levels.
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Table 3. Effect of the single largest owner (SLO) type on performance
Instrumented estimates (Standard errors in parentheses)
Sales Labour cost Profit/Sales ROA
State (Constant) −0.141* (0.076) 0.034 (0.053) −0.197 (0.141) 0.004 (0.012)
Initial ownership (Pij1) − Time-varying effect (β j)
Domestic ownership
Industrial Co. −0.027 (0.029) −0.063*** (0.023) 0.015 (0.078) −0.002 (0.006)
Bank 0.025 (0.065) 0.043 (0.055) 0.005 (0.154) 0.015 (0.014)
Invest. fund 0.015 (0.033) −0.071*** (0.026) −0.080 (0.088) −0.006 (0.007)
Individual 0.022 (0.037) −0.027 (0.031) −0.081 (0.095) 0.001 (0.008)
Portfolio Co. 0.042 (0.068) −0.012 (0.051) −0.098 (0.134) −0.005 (0.012)
Foreign ownership
Industrial Co. 0.107*** (0.042) 0.026 (0.031) 0.180* (0.111) 0.013 (0.009)
Others 0.003 (0.097) −0.055 (0.073) −0.221 (0.192) −0.006 (0.015)
Subsequent ownership (Pijτ) − Time-varying effect (θj)
Domestic ownership
Industrial Co. −0.026 (0.027) −0.041* (0.025) 0.011 (0.093) 0.004 (0.008)
Bank −0.167 (0.150) −0.094 (0.091) 0.338* (0.212) 0.118** (0.052)
Invest. fund −0.096* (0.051) −0.104*** (0.034) 0.062 (0.124) 0.004 (0.014)
Individual 0.050 (0.086) −0.054 (0.053) 0.025 (0.153) 0.004 (0.014)
Portfolio Co. −0.116** (0.058) 0.089 (0.097) −0.091 (0.217) 0.021 (0.020)
Foreign ownership
Industrial Co. 0.061* (0.036) 0.087*** (0.026) 0.094 (0.152) 0.007 (0.010)
Others −0.072 (0.098) −0.015 (0.076) −0.391*** (0.134) 0.009 (0.017)
Ownership change (∆Pijτ) – Time-invariant effect (δ j)
Domestic ownership
Industrial Co. 0.047 (0.034) −0.015 (0.029) 0.043 (0.107) −0.002 (0.009)
Bank 0.072 (0.182) −0.037 (0.122) −0.099 (0.384) −0.152*** (0.061)
Invest. fund 0.106 (0.068) 0.154*** (0.051) 0.087 (0.154) −0.012 (0.016)
Individual −0.062 (0.102) −0.087 (0.062) 0.133 (0.180) −0.013 (0.017)
Portfolio Co. −0.057 (0.075) −0.166 (0.107) 0.235 (0.274) −0.044** (0.023)
Foreign ownership
Industrial Co. 0.066 (0.070) −0.032 (0.052) 0.112 (0.191) −0.021 (0.016)
Others 0.030 (0.111) −0.009 (0.087) 0.223 (0.209) −0.013 (0.022)
Golden share 0.014 (0.025) 0.062*** (0.019) −0.017 (0.090) 0.009 (0.006)
Initial value (Xij1) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000* (0.000) −0.315*** (0.043)
Voucher-privatization dummies
First wave 0.036 (0.067) −0.093* (0.052) 0.024 (0.125) 0.000 (0.010)
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Second wave 0.057 (0.067) −0.117** (0.051) 0.040 (0.130) −0.009 (0.010)
Both waves 0.064 (0.069) −0.097* (0.054) −0.022 (0.136) 0.004 (0.011)
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.044 0.008 0.110
Number of 
observations
2,592 2,949 2,168 2,905
Note: The dependent variables are the rate of change of sales revenue, labour cost, and profit/sales, and the change
in ROA, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1,
5 and 10 percent level, two-tail test, respectively. Industry, privatization, and year dummies are included.
Sales Labour cost Profit/Sales ROA
Table 3. (cont) Effect of the single largest owner (SLO) type on performance
Instrumented estimates (Standard errors in parentheses)
Table 4. Effect of ownership extent on performance
Instrumented estimates (standard errors in parentheses)
Sales Labour cost Profit/sales ROA
Majority state (Constant) –0.175* (0.103) 0.026 (0.054) –0.192 (0.178) 0.005 (0.015)
Initial ownership size (Pij1) − Time-varying effect (β j)
Majority domestic –0.067 (0.113) –0.077** (0.036) –0.001 (0.137) 0.001 (0.011)
Majority foreign 0.299*** (0.117) 0.015 (0.046) –0.044 (0.169) 0.015 (0.012)
Blocking minority state 0.083 (0.107) –0.017 (0.033) –0.145 (0.168) 0.001 (0.012)
Blocking minority domestic 0.014 (0.108) –0.065** (0.034) –0.069 (0.141) –0.009 (0.011)
Blocking minority foreign –0.098 (0.268) –0.063 (0.047) 0.063 (0.213) –0.013 (0.018)
Legal minority state –0.091 (0.137) –0.030 (0.046) –0.051 (0.157) –0.012 (0.014)
Legal minority domestic 0.058 (0.102) –0.049 (0.032) –0.153 (0.136) –0.010 (0.011)
Legal minority foreign –0.075 (0.196) 0.015 (0.089) 0.222 (0.199) 0.003 (0.018)
Other than majority or 
minority
0.358* (0.212) 0.068 (0.059) 0.141 (0.195) –0.020 (0.018)
Subsequent ownership size (Pijτ) − time-varying effect (θj)
Majority domestic –0.030 (0.038) –0.017 (0.036) 0.164* (0.096) 0.015* (0.009)
Majority foreign 0.086* (0.049) 0.037 (0.029) –0.145 (0.163) 0.009 (0.019)
Blocking minority state –0.171** (0.086) –0.136 (0.096) 0.552 (1.085) –0.054 (0.062)
Blocking minority domestic –0.056* (0.032) –0.045* (0.027) 0.008 (0.093) 0.006 (0.008)
Blocking minority foreign 0.067 (0.086) 0.052 (0.040) 0.079 (0.154) 0.015* (0.009)
Legal minority state –0.106 (0.078) 0.353 (0.280) 0.568** (0.248) –0.025 (0.031)
Legal minority domestic 0.006 (0.044) –0.018 (0.025) 0.045 (0.123) 0.017** (0.009)
Legal minority foreign –0.120 (0.080) –0.007 (0.034) –0.049 (0.168) –0.003 (0.021)
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Other than majority or 
minority
–0.387* (0.218) 0.440* (0.240) 0.445 (0.434) 0.073 (0.060)
Ownership change (∆Pijτ) − time-invariant effect (δj)
Majority domestic 0.059 (0.048) 0.004 (0.042) –0.066 (0.117) –0.016 (0.010)
Majority foreign –0.052 (0.071) –0.060 (0.048) 0.088 (0.231) –0.012 (0.024)
Blocking minority state 0.073 (0.097) –0.029 (0.162) –1.385 (1.167) 0.037 (0.066)
Blocking minority domestic 0.069* (0.040) 0.033 (0.033) 0.140 (0.112) –0.015 (0.001)
Blocking minority foreign 0.019 (0.115) 0.069 (0.069) –0.101 (0.200) –0.019 (0.013)
Legal minority state –0.024 (0.126) –0.398 (0.294) –0.609 (0.411) 0.023 (0.037)
Legal minority domestic –0.027 (0.063) –0.042 (0.036) –0.110 (0.156) –0.017 (0.011)
Legal minority foreign 0.344*** (0.124) 0.012 (0.052) 0.078 (0.279) –0.034 (0.031)
Other than majority 
or minority
0.263 (0.229) –0.171 (0.293) 0.145 (0.474) –0.072 (0.063)
Golden share 0.036* (0.022) 0.058*** (0.019) –0.002 (0.093) 0.012** (0.006)
Initial value (Xij1) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000* (0.000) –0.322*** (0.042)
Voucher-privatization dummies
First wave 0.053 (0.074) –0.089* (0.052) 0.053 (0.125) 0.001 (0.010)
Second wave 0.077 (0.073) –0.115** (0.052) 0.051 (0.130) –0.008 (0.010)
Both waves 0.062 (0.077) –0.096* (0.055) 0.001 (0.135) 0.006 (0.011)
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.038 0.008 0.108
Number of observations 2,592 2,949 2,168 2,905
Note: The dependent variables are the rate of change of sales revenue, labour cost, and profit/sales, and the
change in ROA, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance
at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, two-tail test, respectively. Industry, privatization, and year dummies are included.
Sales Labour cost Profit/sales ROA
Table 4. (cont) Effect of ownership extent on performance
Instrumented estimates (standard errors in parentheses)
each other or from the effect of the state SLO. In terms of labour costs (employ-
ment), only firms with domestic industrial companies and investment funds as
SLOs show a negative effect relative to the state. Finally, only firms with foreign
industrial companies as SLOs have a positive effect on profit/sales and no SLO
type generates a significant effect on ROA. The post-privatization foreign indus-
trial owners thus increase profitability by enhancing the rate of growth of sales,
without having a differential effect from the state firms on the rate of growth of
labour cost (employment). Their domestic counterparts and investment fund SLOs
reduce the rate of growth of labour cost, but do not display a corresponding posi-
tive effect on profit. The restructuring carried out by foreign industrial firms is of
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a strategic nature, while that performed by the domestic industrial company and
investment fund SLOs is of a defensive type.
The time-varying performance effects of the SLOs that come into existence after
1996 display a number of similarities to, but also more statistical significance than,
the effects of the immediate post-privatization SLOs. The basic pattern persists in
that (a) most types of private owners do not show significant deviations from the
sales, labour cost and profitability effects given by the base category of state SLOs,
(b) foreign industrial firms raise sales and (c) domestic industrial and investment
fund owners reduce labour cost. The new patterns are that firms acquired after
1996 by investment funds and portfolio companies experience a reduction in sales;
foreign industrial SLOs increase not only sales but also labour costs and they no
longer have a positive effect on profitability; bank SLOs have a positive effect on
profit/sales and ROA; and non-industrial foreign SLOs have a negative effect on
profit/sales. These results suggest that the more recent foreign industrial owners
acquire firms to expand production but they no longer hold back the rate of growth
of labour cost (employment); investment funds reduce the scale of operations; bank
and portfolio company SLOs increase efficiency by reducing non-labour costs and/
or increasing non-sales income; and domestic industrial and foreign non-industrial
SLOs may deploy transfer pricing.34
Interestingly, there are only three time-invariant (instantaneous) effects associ-
ated with the changes in ownership after 1996. Moreover, two of them (higher
labour cost for firms acquired by investment funds and negative effect on ROA for
firms acquired by banks) may represent a short-term effect that is subsequently
offset by an opposite time-varying effect (second panel in the Table 3).
The effect of government control through the institution of a golden share is to
increase labour costs with no corresponding effect on the rate of change of sales or
profitability. With the SLO specification of ownership, the government therefore
appears to pursue a socially oriented goal of increasing employment and/or wages
without a corresponding positive effect on sales or negative effect on profitability.
6.2 Extent of ownership
The estimated effects of the extent of ownership by the three key ownership groups
reported in Table 4, complement the results with respect to the SLOs. Majority and
minority post-privatization ownerships by most types of private owners do not
generate effects that are statistically different from each other and from the base
effect of majority state ownership. The notable exception is majority ownership by
34 In the case of banks, the permanent ROA effect in part offsets a negative instantaneous effect observed at
the time of the shift to bank ownership (third panel in Table 3). The fact that the instantaneous effect is
negative for ROA and not for profit/sales suggests that the banks acquire firms with (a) normal perform-
ance in terms of profit/sales and increase this measure of profitability over time and (b) relatively large and
unproductive assets, as measured by below average ROA, and raise the value of this indicator over time.
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foreign companies which has a positive time-varying effect on sales, thus parallel-
ing the effect of foreign industrial SLOs.35 The difference is that majority foreign-
owned firms, unlike foreign industrial SLOs, do not produce a positive effect on
profitability. This difference may be brought about by the different composition of
the majority and SLO foreign groups, rising non-labour costs or falling non-sales
income in the majority foreign owned firms, or dissipation of profit by majority
foreign owners through transfer pricing. Firms with majority and blocking minor-
ity domestic private ownership, like firms with domestic industrial company and
investment fund SLOs in Table 3, are the only ones that significantly reduce labour
costs (employment). Because no type of post-privatization ownership registers
significant effects with respect to either indicator of profitability, the reduction in
labour cost by concentrated domestic owners may be accompanied by increased
non-labour cost or falling non-sales income, or appropriation of resources by
managers or key shareholders.
Overall, the effects of initial post privatization ownership indicate that con-
centrated foreign ownership raises the rate of increase in sales revenue, while highly,
as well as moderately concentrated domestic owners reduce the rate of increase in
labour cost (employment) relative to others. These asymmetric findings with
respect to the sales and labour cost effects of concentrated domestic and foreign
owners are provocative because it has been widely presumed that both domestic
and foreign private ownership, especially in highly concentrated forms, would
lead to substantial strategic restructuring and increases in sales − domestically
and/or on the world markets.
The time-varying effects of ownership changes that took place after 1996 show
some similarities but also significant differences from the effects of initial post-
privatization ownership. A post-1996 shift to majority foreign ownership has a
positive effect on the rate of increase in sales revenue that is not accompanied by
an increase in the rate of change in labour cost or profitability. This suggests that
foreign owners that acquire majority stakes in firms after privatization engage in
productivity-enhancing strategic restructuring and either incur increasing non-labour
costs and/or falling non-sales revenue, or they siphon off profits. In contrast, shifts
to blocking minority state and domestic ownership bring about negative effects
on both sales and labour cost, indicating that these somewhat less concentrated
owners react defensively by downsizing the newly acquired companies.
A switch to majority domestic ownership results in a positive time-varying
effect on both measures of profitability. Interestingly, positive time-varying effects
on ROA are also observed with shifts to blocking minority foreign and legal minor-
ity domestic ownerships. Moreover, the relatively rare shifts to legal minority state
ownership also generate sizable positive effects on the increase in profit/sales.
35 There is also a positive effect of highly dispersed ownership. This group is composed of a small number
of firms, however, and there is an offsetting effect associated with subsequent ownership by this group.
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As may be seen from Table 4, firms in which the state retains a golden share
register positive time-varying effects on sales, labour cost and ROA. These effects
complement the estimates from the SLO specification and suggest that the state
pursues an objective of increasing employment and output (revenue), while also
inducing profit-oriented restructuring relative to assets. Since the state retains
golden shares primarily in state-owned and domestic private firms (Table 2), the
effect of a golden share moderates the tendency in some of these firms to reduce
output (sales) and/or employment.
7. Concluding observations
With the former Soviet bloc and other developing countries having privatized
state-owned enterprises, and the economies of China, India and Vietnam being in
the process of privatization, it is important to have an understanding of the post-
privatization effects of different forms of ownership on firm performance. While
theory generates conflicting predictions, most surveys of the early empirical
literature suggest that a shift from state to private ownership tends to improve
economic performance. However, much of the early literature suffers from serious
data problems and inadequate treatment of endogeneity of ownership, thus
leaving many results in doubt. In this paper, we analyse the effect of ownership on
performance using rich panel data covering a virtually entire population of firms
that went through mass privatization in the Czech Republic. In doing so, we address
carefully the principal data issues, including omitted variables bias, measurement
error and endogeneity of ownership.
Overall, our econometric estimates present a much less sanguine picture
than that presented by many of the earlier studies, suggesting that the expecta-
tions and early findings of positive effects of immediate post-privatization
ownership structures on corporate performance were premature. Our results
indicate that the performance effects of privatization and different types of
ownership are on the whole surprisingly limited and that many types of private
owners do not generate performance that is different from that of firms with
state ownership. There are two key exceptions to this overall result. First, con-
centrated foreign owners (foreign industrial, that is, non-financial, companies) yield
superior performance in terms of growth of sales and in some specifications
also profit − thus, reflecting the presence of strategic restructuring. Second, con-
centrated domestic owners (industrial companies and investment funds) reduce
employment − thus, engaging in defensive restructuring. These findings are
consistent with the agency theory prediction that concentrated ownership results
in superior corporate performance and they go against theories stressing the
positive effects of managerial autonomy. Overall, our results highlight the benefits
of strategic restructuring accompanied by an inflow of new capital and managerial
culture.
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Statistical Appendix
Table A1. Pre-privatization characteristics of firms
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Panel A
Variable
Registered capital (in thousands of korunas)  419,607 1,877,644 3,141 49,200,000
Net asset value (in thousands of korunas)  489,480 2,178,180 3,490 56,000,000
Total number of shares  412,827 1,870,709 3,141 49,200,000
Number of shares entering voucher 
privatization
 220,490  656,943 2,202 14,800,000
Number of shares allocated through 
voucher privatization
 204,935  629,464 1,537 13,800,000
Value of shares in terms of voucher points 6,903,206 24,200,000 67,300 611,000,000
Panel B
Regions
Prague 15.83% 0.3651 0 1
Central Bohemia 8.14% 0.2735 0 1
Southern Bohemia 7.77% 0.2677 0 1
Western Bohemia 10.28% 0.3038 0 1
Northern Bohemia 11.32% 0.3169 0 1
Eastern Bohemia 12.72% 0.3333 0 1
Southern Moravia 18.71% 0.3902 0 1
Northern Moravia 15.24% 0.3595 0 1
Panel C
Industrial sectors
Agriculture 18.20% 0.3859 0 1
Heavy machinery 29.88% 0.4579 0 1
Light machinery 17.46% 0.3797 0 1
Constructions 13.02% 0.3366 0 1
Transportation 4.07% 0.1976 0 1
Trade 9.10% 0.2877 0 1
R&D 1.48% 0.1208 0 1
Services 4.29% 0.2027 0 1
Financial 0.96% 0.0976 0 1
Other 1.55% 0.1237 0 1
Note: The number of observations is 1,352 for each variable.
SD, standard deviation.
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Table A2. Proposed allocation of shares among parties (in %)
Table A3. Performance indicators prior to privatization
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Foreign owner 1.3225 7.6277 0 75
Domestic owner 3.7663 12.8294 0 74
Restitution 0.5222 3.0640 0 58
Fund of national property (temporary) 8.4615 16.6760 0 84
Fund of national property (permanent) 0.1709 2.3046 0 51
Sale through intermediary 2.0666 8.5860 0 75
Municipality transfer 3.4379 13.3587 0 94
Other 3.0377 8.0087 0 81
Total number of privatization projects 3.0178 7.0905 1 77
Note: The number of observations is 1,352 for each variable. SD, standard deviation.
Variable per share No. of 
observations
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Sales
3 years to privatization 1,210 3.6350 40.3716 0.001050 1,297.0630
2 years to privatization 1,210 3.5091 46.8384 0.000000 1,614.1270
1 year to privatization 1,346 2.3407 7.0245 0.001787  200.0090
Profit
3 years to privatization 1,196 0.2650 1.8867 –1.587883  43.7188
2 years to privatization 1,269 0.3058 3.5251 –2.234356  117.8678
1 year to privatization 1,338 0.1919 1.3306 –10.135990  38.4093
Debt
3 years to privatization  916 0.6610 2.0698 0.000249  31.8724
2 years to privatization 1,021 0.6183 1.8527 0.000121  38.1252
1 year to privatization 1,155 0.6284 2.1576 0.000092  32.1283
Employment
3 years to privatization 1,221 0.0061 0.0150 0.000002  0.4177
2 years to privatization 1,281 0.0057 0.0142 0.000002  0.3998

















































Prague 0.022 –0.001 –0.049 –0.063* –0.068** 0.219*** 0.000
Central Bohemia 0.141** 0.023 –0.124* –0.005 –0.046 0.182*** 0.039**
Southern Bohemia 0.127** 0.000 –0.030 –0.164** –0.039 0.121** 0.036*
Western Bohemia 0.050 0.000 –0.026 –0.071* 0.002 0.149** 0.017
Northern Bohemia 0.020 0.000 –0.079 –0.004 –0.029 0.183*** 0.038*
Eastern Bohemia 0.084 0.003 –0.091* –0.026 –0.020 0.082 0.028
Southern Moravia 0.130** 0.015 –0.076* –0.026 –0.016 0.113* –0.007
Intended ownership (percent)
Foreign owner –0.011*** 0.000 –0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Domestic owner 0.004*** 0.002*** –0.004* 0.000 0.001 –0.004*** 0.000
Restitution 0.014 0.004 –0.002 –0.009 –0.014 0.004 0.000
Fund of national property (temporary) –0.002 0.001** –0.003* –0.001 0.001* –0.002** 0.001**
Fund of national property (permanent) 0.002 0.000 –0.008 –0.005 0.004 0.000 0.000
Sale through intermediary 0.002 0.000 0.003* 0.000 0.000 –0.003*** 0.001
Municipality transfer –0.025*** 0.000 –0.002 –0.005 0.000 –0.002** 0.001**
Other 0.008*** 0.000 –0.007 –0.011** 0.001 –0.004*** –0.003
Quantitative privatization characteristics
Privatized in voucher scheme 0.000 0.001*** 0.004** 0.001 0.001 –0.005*** 0.002***
Total number of privatization projects 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.002* –0.001 –0.003 –0.001 –0.021
Total number of shares (mil.) 0.088 0.053** 0.166 0.365 –0.142 –0.214** 0.140**
Total number of shares (mil.) (squared) –0.003 –0.005 –0.084*** –0.125 –0.033 –0.042 –0.014*
Total number of shares in the 
voucher scheme (mil.)

























Sold shares (mil.) –0.025 0.135 0.197 –0.653 0.730 0.312 0.402*
Sold points (mil.) –0.002 0.583 –0.005** –0.302 –0.004* 0.003** 0.216
Share average price in voucher scheme 0.000 0.000 0.002** –0.001 0.001* 0.000 0.000
Share average price in voucher scheme
[squared]
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000
Constant –0.433 –0.206** –0.432 –0.131 –0.164 0.175 –0.289***
Pre-privatization characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.175 0.464 0.219 0.157 0.142 0.386 0.325





















Table A4. (cont) First stage logit regressions: Marginal effects of the ownership type [dP(x = 1)/dx]



























Prague –0.138*** 0.147*** –0.033 0.089* 0.054** 0.045* –0.084 –0.054 0.000
Central Bohemia –0.092* 0.118*** –0.006 0.063 0.082*** 0.000 –0.019 0.000 –0.01
Southern Bohemia –0.042 0.038 0.000 –0.006 0.080*** 0.06** –0.043 0.000 0.000
Western Bohemia –0.186*** 0.075** 0.051** 0.141** 0.081*** 0.047 –0.031 –0.002 0.000
Northern Bohemia –0.096* 0.096*** 0.05** 0.040 0.058** 0.04 –0.005 0.037*** 0.000
Eastern Bohemia –0.046 0.073* 0.049** 0.069 0.021 0.063** –0.079 0.000 0.01




























Foreign owner –0.001 0.003*** 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 –0.008** 0.000 0.000
Domestic owner 0.003** –0.002*** 0.001** 0.002 –0.001 –0.001 0.000 –0.001 0.001
Restitution 0.013* 0.000 0.000 –0.007 0.001 0.002 –0.003 0.004** 0.000
Fund of national property (temporary) 0.000 –0.001* 0.002*** 0.004** 0.001* –0.001 –0.007*** 0.002*** 0.000
Fund of national property (permanent) –0.022 –0.001 0.001 0.019* 0.000 0.000 –0.009 0.000 0.000
Sale through intermediary 0.004** 0.000 0.000 0.004** 0.000 –0.004 –0.003 0.001* 0.000
Municipality transfer –0.013* –0.001 0.001* –0.003 0.000 0.001 –0.007** 0.001 –0.002
Other 0.006*** –0.013*** 0.001 0.001 0.000 –0.001 –0.005* 0.001 –0.008**
Quantitative privatization characteristics
Privatized in voucher scheme 0.002 –0.001* 0.000 0.004*** 0.000 –0.002** 0.002 0.001 –0.001**
Total number of privatization projects 0.004** –0.001 0.000 –0.005* 0.001* –0.003* 0.006*** –0.024 0.000
Total number of shares (mil.) 0.407*** 0.146 0.005 –0.079 –0.007 –0.122* 0.039 –0.066 0.017
Total number of shares (mil.) [squared] –0.050*** –0.061 0.060 0.002 –0.375 –0.021* –0.009 –0.025 –0.002
Total number of shares in the voucher 
scheme (mil.)
–1.388** –0.148 –0.064 0.022 –0.647* 0.813*** 0.205 –0.954 0.067
Sold shares (mil.) 0.715 0.017 0.064 –0.011 0.673* –0.656*** 0.050 0.937 –0.100
Sold points (mil.) –0.386 –0.001 –0.149 0.566 0.581 0.004** –0.006** 0.002* 0.002**
Share average price in voucher scheme –0.001 0.001** 0.000 –0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.002** 0.000 0.000
Share average price in voucher scheme 
[squared]
0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000
Constant –0.264 –0.042 –0.224* –0.680*** –0.078 –0.108 –0.224 –0.107** 0.011
Pre-privatization characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.245 0.321 0.12 0.11 0.2 0.317 0.179 0.523 0.513


























Table A5. (cont) First stage logit regressions: Marginal effects of the ownership size [dP(x = 1)/dx]
